Reliable communication between parties in a network is a basic requirement for executing any protocol. Dolev [4] and Dolev et al. [5] showed that reliable communication is possible if and only if the communication network is sufficiently connected. Beimel and Franklin [1] showed that the connectivity requirement can be relaxed if some pairs of parties share authentication keys. That is, costly communication links can be replaced by authentication keys.
INTRODUCTION
Suppose that some processors are connected by a network of reliable channels. All of the processors cooperate to execute some protocol, but some of them are maliciously faulty. Dolev [4] and Dolev et al. [5] proved that if there are t faulty processors, then every pair of processors can communicate reliably if and only if the network is (2t + 1)-connected. Beimel and Franklin [1] showed that the connectivity requirement can be relaxed if some pairs of parties share authentication keys. That is, instead of costly communication channels, we can give some pairs of processors (other than the pairs connected by channels) authentication keys, i.e., the means to identify messages from the other.
In this paper we consider the problem of "single-pair" reliable communication. In this problem there is a specific sender who wants to send a message to a specific receiver, such that any coalition of at most t faulty processors cannot prevent this transmission.
any information on the message that is being sent and cannot prevent it. In [1] it is shown that reliable and private communication from a to b is possible if and only if reliable communication from a to b and from b to a are possible. Thus, our results translate into more efficient reliable and private communication.
We also give a simple characterization for reliable communication against one Byzantine processor. We show that in this case a simple necessary condition, namely that the communication graph is 2-connected between a and b and the union of the communication and authentication graphs is 3-connected between a and b is "basically" sufficient. This characterization implies that reliable communication is symmetric for t = 1. However, we show that the natural generalization of this condition to t > 2 is not sufficient. Finally, we show that reliable communication is not symmetric for t > 2. That is, there is a communication graph and an authentication graph for which reliable communication is possible from a to b, but is not possible from b to a. This result is somewhat counter-intuitive as the edges are bi-directional.
Organization. In Section 2, we describe our model, supply results from [1] , and describe a simplified protocol SIMPLESEND which is analyzed in this paper. In Section 3, we study the properties of the "effective communication graph." In Section 4 we use these properties to prove that our protocol is efficient. In Section 5 we give a simple characterization of the possibility of reliable communication with one Byzantine processor. In Section 6, we prove that the simple necessary condition is not sufficient for t > 2, and reliable communication is not symmetric for t > 2.
PRELIMINARIES

The Model
The network is modeled by an undirected graph Gc = IV, Ec), where V is the set of parties in the network (i.e., IVI = n), and Ec describes the communication channels. That is, there is an edge (u, v) in Ec if and only if there is a communication channel between u and v. We assume that these communication channels are reliable: an adversary that does not control u or v (but might control all other vertices in the network) cannot change or delete a message sent on the edge (u, v) or insert a message on the channel. We assume that some pairs of parties share authentication keys. We informally explain what authentication schemes are; the reader is referred to, e.g., [15] for more details. An authentication scheme enables a sender and a receiver who share a common key to exchange messages such that the receiver can verify that the message was sent by the sender. We describe which pairs of parties have a common authentication key by a graph GA = (V~EA). That is, u and v have a common key, denoted by k~,,v, if and only if (u, v) E EA. These keys are chosen according to some known probability distribution, and every set of vertices has no information on the keys of disjoint edges (except for their a-priori probability distribution).
We consider protocols for message transmission, in which a transmitter a E V wants to transmit a message M to a receiver b E V. We assume that the system is synchronous. That is, a protocol proceeds in rounds; at the beginning of each round each party v E V sends messages to some of its neighbors in the graph Go. These messages get to the neighbors before the beginning of the next round. We assume that all parties in the system know the topology of the graphs Gc and GA. Furthermore, all the parties in the system know in which round party a starts to transmit a message to party b. The round complexity of a protocol is the number of rounds that have elapsed from its activation to its termination. The message complexity of a protocol is the total number of bits in messages exchanged in a round, maximized over all the rounds, During the execution there might be Byzantine attacks (also known as "active attacks"). An adversary, with an unlimited power, controls a subset T of the parties. The adversary knows the protocol, the distribution under which the authentication keys where chosen, and the topology of the network (i.e., Gc and GA). The adversary can choose T during the execution of the protocol. For every party in T, the adversary knows all the messages received by that party, its random inputs, and its keys. From the moment a party is included into T, the adversary determines the messages this party sends thereafter (possibly deviating from the protocol specification in an arbitrary manner). DEFINITION 2.1 (RELIABLE PROTOCOL). Let a, b E V be a transmitter and a receiver, and t < n -2. We say that a message transmission protocol from a to b is t-reliable if for every integer c there exists kc such that for every message M of length at least kc, when the adversary can control any set W of at most t parties such that T C V \ {a, b}, the probability that b accepts the message 1 M, given that a transmitted M, is at least 1 -i~1 ~, where the probability is over the random inputs of the parties, the distribution of the authentication keys, and the random input of the adversary.
In this paper we consider the problem of fault restricted reliable communication, which is a tool for characterizing when t-reliable transmission between a given pair of parties is possible. In the fault restricted version one of two given sets To, T1, which are not necessarily disjoint, is guaranteed to contain all of the faulty processors. It was shown in [1] that if there is a (To, T1)-reliable protocol for every pair of sets of size at most t, then there is a t-reliable protocol. This t-reliable protocol executes (in parallel) the (To, T1)-reliable protocol for every pair of sets of size t, and the receiver learns the message that was sent from the sender by analyzing the results of these executions. In particular, if t is constant and the (To, T1)-reliable protocol is efficient for every To, T1 of size at most t, then the resulting t-reliable protocol is efficient.
DEFINITION 2.2 (FAULT RESTRICTED PROTOCOL
The reliability of a network is closely related to its connectivity. We consider vertex connectivity of undirected graPhs. Two paths from a to b are vertex disjoint if no vertices other than a and b appear on both paths. A path P passes through a set T if there is a vertex u E T in the path. Otherwise, we say that P misses
there are t vertex disjoint paths from u to v. There is an efficient algorithm that checks whether a graph is (t, u, v)-connected (see, e.g., [7] ).
Characterizing Reliable Communication
In this section we quote the definition of G* and a confusing pair from [1] . These definitions characterize when a can reliably communicate with b. To motivate the next definition consider an authentication edge {u, v) with a semi-honest path from u to v in Gc that passes through Ti, and a honest path from v to b in Go. When u wants to send a message M to v, it authenticates M using the shared key k~.~ and then sends the authenticated message along the semi-honest path from u to v. If the message never arrives at v or if it arrives with improper authentication, then v immediately knows that the set T~ is controlled by the adversary. Furthermore, v can share this information with b using the honest path from v to b. Finally, define G* = G~.
Informally, the graph G* is the "effective" communication graph, as it contains exactly the edges that can be used to reliably transmit a message from a to b. Property (2) ensures that v learns the Byzantine set if an improper message arrives from u, and Property (3) ensures that it can tell b about it. Also, as EA is finite, there is a k for which Ek+i = Ek for every i > 0. The graph G* is defined as G~ since it is proven in [1] that E~+~ = E~ for all i_>0. REMARK 2.5. Authenticating a message M over an authentication edge e = {u, v) E EA is not necessary if there is a honest path from u to v in Go. In such case, M is reliably transmitted over that path, and e can be discarded. Hence, w.l.o.g., we assume throughout the paper that there are no such edges in EA.
We next define the notion of level of an edge, which is the stage in which it joins G*. Formally, :for an edge e = (u, v) define level(e) N min {jle C Ej}. Note that e is a communication edge iff it has level 0. The level of a path P is defined by level(P) = max {level(e) le E P}. Obviously, a path has level 0 iffit is a path in Go. Also, for every authentication edge e with level(e) = j, there is a semi-honest path from u to v of level at most j -1, and there is a honest path from either u or v to b of level at most j -1. Therefore, if there is a honest path P~,b from v to b of level at most j -1, then there is another honest path P~,,b = (u, v), P~,b from u to b of level at most j. We conclude that there is a honest path from both u and v to b of level at most j.
We use Graph1 described in Fig. 1 to demonstrate these definitions. In this graph we have (v,b) E E1 since (v, tl,b) is a semi-honest path from v to b in Go. Hence, the level of (% b) is 1. Next, (u, v) is added to E2 because {u, to, b, v) is a semi-honest path from u to b in G1 and (v, b) is a honest path from v to b in G1. Hence, the level of {u, v) is 2. Finally, the edge (a, u) is added to .E'a and its level is 3.
DEFINITION 2.6 (CONFUSING PAIR). A pair (To, 7"1) is an (a, b) confusing pair if To, T1 C V \ {a, b}, and at least one of the following holds: 1. There is an index i E {0, 1} such that every path from u to b in
Gc passes through Ti.
Every path from a to b in G* passes through To U T1.
THEOREM2.7 ([1]). For all To, T1 C V \ {a,b} it holds that (To, T1 )-reliable message transmission from a to b is possible if and only if(To, T1)
is not an (a, b) confusing pair.
The Depth of Edges
Beimel and Franklin used the level of edges in order to bound the round complexity of the protocol. The contribution of this paper is a more efficient protocol, and it starts with the introduction of depth of an edge. The depth of an edge is at most the level of an edge, but it can be significantly smaller. Moreover, the level of edges can be as much as O(n) whereas the depth on an edge can be at most t.
We intuitively explain the following definition of the notion of depth. Consider some t E To t.J Ti. We say that a level j + 1 is significant for t if j is the smallest for which t is in the connected component ofb in Gj. The depth of an edge of level j is the number of levels j' < j that are significant for some t E To U Ta.
DEFINITION 2.8 (DEPTH OF AN EDGE). The following inductive definition over the graphs Gj is of subsets of To U T1. For Go = Gc let Bo = 0 and for every j > 1, define Bj to be the set of all t E To tJ T1, for which the following properties hold: • For every 0 < j' < j it holds that t ~ By, and • For the i E {0, 1} such that t E Ti there is a path from t to b in G j-1 that misses T 7.
We denote depth
and say that an edge e is of depth d if depth(level(e)) = d.
Note that e is of depth 0 iff e E Gc iff e is of level 0. For a path P we define depth(P) = max {depth(e)[e C P}. Therefore, a path P is of depth 0 iffP is in Gc iff the level of/:' is 0. The depth of the graph G* is the maximal depth over all the edges in G*. For example, in Graph2 described in Fig. 1 we have B1 = {to, t~ }. Hence, all of the authentication edges are of depth 1 and the depth of Graph2 is 1. We next bound the depth of G*.
LEMMA 2.9. If there is no honest path from a to b in Gc and G c is ( t + 1, a, b )-connected, then the depth of G* is at most t.
PROOF. Let Gc be the communication graph. Since Gc is (t + 1, a, b)-connected, there are at least t + 1 disjoint paths from a to b in Gc. If there is no honest path from a to b in Go, then none of these paths is honest and there is at least one Byzantine vertex on each one of them. From each of these Byzantine vertices there is a path to b that has no other Byzantine vertices on it, and therefore IBll > t -J-1. Thus, there are at most another 2t -(t + 1) = t ~ 1 sets Bj for which Bj ¢ 0, and the depth of G* is as asserted. [3
The Protocol SimpleSend
The procedure SIMPLESEND(M, u, v), described in Fig. 2 , transmits a message through a path in G*. For every authentication edge (u', v') on the path it recursively calls to SIMPLESEND(M, u', v') tO transmit the message with its authentication on a path from u to v. This procedure guarantees that if the original path contains no Byzantine processors and the message arrives at v then this message is indeed the message that u sent. However, if these conditions do not hold then no guarantees are made. The protocol In this work we only analyze the round complexity of the protocol SIMPLESEND(M, u, v). Claim 2.11, which is implicit in [11, proves that SEND(M, u, v) is efficient if SIMPLESEND(M, u, v) is efficient.
CLAIM 2.1 1. Iffor ever 3, u E V protocol SIMPLESEND(M, u, b) terminates after at most ~-rounds, then for every u E V protocol SEND(M, u, b) terminates after at most n • 7-rounds.
Protocol S IMPLESEND(M, u, v) can choose any semi-honest path from u to v. Exploiting the special structure of G*, we show in the rest of the paper how to choose these paths such that the resulting protocol is efficient (at least for a constant number of Byzantine processors). As observed in [1], for every authentication edge (u, v) of level j there is a path from u to v in G* of level j -1. Thus, transmitting a message on an authentication edge of level j can be done by at most n transmissions on edges of level j -1, yielding a protocol with round complexity n °(n).
The first property that we introduce is of paths that end in b. Specifically, for every authentication edge (u, v) there is a path from both u and v to b which has at most one edge of each level. The concatenation of the path from u to b with the path from b to v is a path from u to v that has at most two edges of each level. By simple induction this yields a protocol with round complexity 20(n).
Both approaches fail to consider the impact of the number of Byzantine vertices on the round complexity of the protocol. The main contribution of this paper is the concept of depth. When we send a message from u to b we choose a path in which the depths of authentication edges do not increase. We prove an upper bound on the round complexity of sending a message over an authentication edge that is exponential in the depth of the edge and linear in its level. The resulting protocol has round complexity n °(t). EXAMPLE 2.12. Consider Graph2 described in Fig. 1 in which To = {to, t2} and T1 = {tl,ta}. To send a message over the authentication edge (a, ul), the semi-honest path {a, to, b, t2, u2, ul) can be used. This requires a recursive send on the authentication edge (ul, u2). To send a message over (ul, u2) we can use the semi-honest path (u l, tl, b, ta, ua, u2) which requires a recursive send on the authentication edge (u2, u3). For the edge (u2, ua) we use the semi-honest path (u2, t2, b, u4, u3) which requires a recursive send on the authentication edge (u3, u4).
Artificial example as it may seem, we show in Lemma 4.1 that every graph has the structure of Graph2 and then we analyze the transmission costs in such structure. We show that these costs are linear with respect to the level and exponential with respect to the depth. The somewhat technical proofs in Section 3 provide us with the tools that enable the construction of such structure.
The following lemma, which is used in Section 4, proves that the round complexity of transmitting M from u to v is equal to the round complexity of transmitting M from v to u for all u, v C V. This implies that the round complexity of the protocol could be analyzed regardless of the direction upon which M is sent.
LEMMA 2.13. If there is an implementation of the protocol SIMPLESEND(M, ~z, v) that terminates after g rounds, then there is an implementation of S IMPLES END(M, v, u) that terminates after g rounds.
PROOF. First, assume that recursive calls to SIMPLESEND terminate after only one round. Let P~,.,~ be the semi-honest path chosen in the execution of SIMPLESEND(M, u, v). Since the reverse path P~,~, is a semi-honest path as well, and since we assume that recursive calls to SIMPLESEND terminate after one round, the round complexity of SIMPLESEND(M, u, v) is equal to the round complexity of SIMPLESEND(M, v, u). It is possible to avoid the assumption that recursive calls to SIMPLESEND terminate after one round by using induction. [] The fact that Protocol SIMPLESEND is symmetric with respect to the sender and the receiver does not imply that reliable communication is symmetric with respect to the sender and the receiver.
The reason is that the alert mechanism added to SIMPLESEND is 
PROPERTIES OF THE GRAPH G*
In this section we analyze t.he graph G*. In particular, we show that paths that end in b have additional properties. Our protocol utilizes this analysis in order to more effectively transmit a message over an authentication edge.
Monotonicity
The first property that we introduce is path monotonicity. Specifically, monotonous paths have only one authentication edge of each level. As explained above, monotonous paths imply a protocol with round complexity 2 °(r0.
DEFINITION 3.1 (MONOTONOUS PATH). A path P is monotonous if for all authentication edges el and e2 in P, whenever e2 precedes el in the path P, then level(e2) is strictly larger then level(el).
For example, the path (a, ul, uz, u3, u4, b) in Graph2 (described in Fig. 1 ) is a monotonous path. Note that P is monotonous implies that the first authentication edge e on P has the highest level over all of the other edges in P. Hence, the level of P is determined by the level of this edge and vice versa. Also, note that if P is of level 0 (i.e., P is a path in Go), then P is monotonous. 
Left Edges and Left Paths
We further introduce the second property of paths that end in b, which we call left paths.
DEFINITION 3.3 (LEFT AND RIGHT EDGES).
An authentication edge e = (u, v) of level j is l e f t / f the following properties hold:
1. There is a honest path from v to b of level at most j -1.
There is a semi-honest path P~,v from u to v of level at most j -1, with at least one Byzantine vertex on this path, where for the leftmost Byzantine vertex ~ on Pu,v, the prefix ( u , . . . , t) of P~,~ is in Gc.
An edge (u, v) is right iff (v, u) is left. A path P is left if e is left for every authentication edge e C P.
For an illustration of a left edge see Fig. 4 case (1). For example, the authentication edge (a, ul) of level 4 in Graph2 described in PROOF. Let e = (u, v) be an authentication edge of level j. We prove by induction on j, that e is either left or right. For every edge of level 1 there is a semi-honest path from u to v in Gc.
Remark 2.5 implies that there must be at least one Byzantine vertex on this path. If there is a honest path from v to b of level 0, then e is left. Otherwise, there is a honest path from u to b of level 0 and e is right.
Assume that every authentication edge of level at most j -1 is either left or right. The induction step for j is as follows: Let e = (u, v) be an edge of level j. If there is a semi-honest path from u to v in Gc, then similar arguments to those in the base case hold, and e is either left or fight. Otherwise, let P be a semi-honest path from u to v with at least one authentication edge, and choose P with a minimal level among the semi-honest paths from u to v. Denote the level of P by j', where 1 _< j ' < j, and let el = (ul, vl) and e2 == (u2, v~) be the leftmost and fightmost authentication edges on P, respectively (ca and e2 can be the same edge). Denote P,,x,b and P~2 ,b to be honest minimal level paths from Ul and v2, respectively, to b. Define P~,~ ~ ( % . . . ,ua), Pul, b, Pb, v2, (v2, ... , v) . Note that P~,,,, is a semi-honest path from u to v of level at most j ' that misses T? for some i E {0, 1}. Since P~,a,b, Pb,,,2 is a honest path, any Byzantine vertex on P~,,,,, if there is any, may appear only on (u . . . . ,Ul) or ( v z , . . . , v). There are three cases to consider; in each case we construct the paths proving that e is either left or right. • There are tl,t2 E T~ such that tl is a Byzantine vertex in ( u , . . . , ul), and t2 is the a Byzantine in (v2,.
•., v): Note that there is w E {u, v} for which there is a honest path from w to b of level at most j -1. If w = u then e is fight. Otherwise, w = v and e is left. See Assume that the induction hypothesis holds for every authentication edge e of level at most j. For the induction step, let e = (u, v) be a left authentication edge of level j + 1. By Definition 3.3 there is a honest path from v to b of level at most j. Therefore, there is a minimal j ' < j for which there is a honest path from v to b of level j ' . By Lemma 3. 
E F F I C I E N T I M P L E M E N T A T I O N OF PRO-T O C O L S I M P L E S E N D
In this section we consider the depth of paths used by the protocol, in order to better analyze its running time. We express the transmission cost in terms of depth, which is at most t, and prove that the running time of the protocol is n °(t) . In particular, this implies that the protocol is efficient whenever the number of Byzantine vertices is constant.
We use the following notation throughout our analysis: For all vertices w E V such that there is semi-honest path from w to b of depth at most d define cost Consider the path P.,,~+~. This path is also a left, monotonous, honest path from v to v~+~. By Lemma 3.6 there is a semi-honest path P~e,b from ue to b of depth at most d -1 for every 1 < ~ < m + 1 (see Fig. 5 ). This implies that there is a semi-honest path most cost(t) < (t + 1) nIIk=O ( k + 1) 2 rounds. Let j be the highest level of an edge in G*, and notice that `50 +`51 ÷" • • +`5t = j t `5 and thatj < n. Also, l~k=0( k + 1) 2 is maximal when `51 = `52 = .... 6t= t t -<2-'n Finally, since t <_ n -2, we conclude that: 
CHARACTERIZING RELIABLE COM-MUNICATION WITH ONE BYZANTINE PARTY
In this section, we consider the reliable transmission problem in the specific case of t = 1. A simple necessary condition for reliable transmission in this case is that the communication graph Gc is (2, a, b)-connected, and that G = Gc tJ GA is (3, a,b)-connected. We prove that in this case (i.e., t = 1) this condition is basically the characterization for reliable transmission. 
RELIABLE COMMUNICATION IS NOT SYMMETRIC FOR T _> 2
In the previous section we haw: seen a simple characterization for the case t = 1. In this section we show that the characterization for t = 1 can not be applied to t > 2. Moreover, we show that t-reliable communication is not symmetric. PROOF. For t = 2, consider Graph1 and the Byzantine sets described in Fig. 6 . There is no semi-honest path from u to v, for every authentication edge (% v). By Property (2) of the graph Graphl* this implies that (u, v) ~ E* for every authentication edge (u,v) in Graphl. Since Graphl* is the communication graph Graph1, and since there is no honest path from a to b in Graph1*, by Definition 2.6 of a confusing pair, the pair (To, T1) is an (a, b) confusing pair in Graph1*, which implies that 2-reliable communication from a to b in Graphl is impossible. For t > 2 consider the graph described in Fig 2. There are no Byzantine vertices on either P1 or P2: Consider the path P1. Regardless of whether vl or v2 are Byzantine, there is a semi-honest path from u4 to ua, and there is a honest path (ua, b) from ua to b. Therefore (u4, ua) E E2. Finally, (u4, a) C Ea and all the edges on P1 are added to G*, which implies that P1 is in G*. We conclude that if there are no Byzantine vertices on P~ then the path P~ is in G*. Symmetric arguments hold for P2, and therefore either P~ or P2 is an honest path from a to b in G*.
In both cases there is a honest communication path from a to b in G* for all To, T1 C V \ {a, b} of size at most t, and we conclude that t-reliable communication from a to b is possible. We now show that t-reliable communication from b to a is impossible. Fix To = {vl, vt+2,..., v2t} and T1 = {v2,..., vt+l}. We show that (To,T1) is a confusing pair in G* with respect to (b, a). Consider the path P1, and note that (a, ua) ~ E1 because there is no semi-honest path from a to u4 in the communication graph of G. Furthermore, (zta, u4) is not added to E1 since there is no honest path from either u3 or u4 to a. For the same reason (ua, b) is not added to El. We conclude that no edge on P1 is added to G*. By symmetry, no edge on P2 is added to G*, and G* is the communication graph of G. Since there is no honest path from b to a in G*, this implies that (To, T1) is a (b,a) confusing pair in G*, which implies that t-reliable communication from b to a is impossible.
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